Internationally, there is extensive empirical evidence that a strong primary care-led health system is associated with improved health outcomes, increased quality of care, decreased health inequalities and lower overall health-care costs. Within primary care, factors influencing access to, and utilisation of, general practitioner (GP) services have been widely examined and this paper focuses on the role of user financial incentives. In particular, user charges for health care have been observed to deter health-care utilisation. Relative to other countries, the Irish healthcare system is unusual in that the majority of the population are required to pay out-of-pocket for GP care. However, in 2005 the Irish government extended eligibility for free GP care to a further small subset of the population. Using micro-data from a nationally representative survey of the population in 2007, this paper analyses the impact of differential coverage of free GP services on GP utilisation in Ireland. Results from multivariate regression analysis indicate that GP utilisation is significantly more likely in the context of free GP care, controlling for a range of demographic, socio-economic and health factors. Interpretation of the results for the new category of coverage is complicated by possible pent-up demand and selection effects.
INTRODUCTION
Internationally, there is extensive empirical evidence that a strong primary care-led health system is associated with improved health outcomes, increased quality of care, decreased health inequalities and lower overall health care costs (Basu et al., 2002; Macinko et al., 2003; Shi et al., 2005; Starfield et al., 2002; Starfield et al., 2005) . National and international statements of health strategy contain commitments to strengthen the role of primary care, and to move away from the traditional focus on diagnosis and treatment to concentrate on prevention and maintenance of good health (DoHC, 2001; WHO, 2008) .
Within primary care, factors influencing access to, and utilisation of, general practitioner (GP) services have been widely examined and this paper focuses on the role of financial incentives facing users. In particular, user charges for health care have been observed to deter health-care utilisation. Relative to other countries, the Irish health-care system is unusual in that the majority of the population are required to pay out-of-pocket for GP care (Smith, 2010) . However, in 2005 the Irish government extended eligibility for free GP care to a further small subset of the population. As longitudinal data on GP visiting before and after the policy change are not available, this study uses cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of the population in 2007 to analyse the behaviour of those with and without cover for free GP care in M A N U S C R I P T
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3 Ireland. The key hypothesis of this paper is that due to the existence of differing prices for GP services across the population, we expect to see a gradient in GP visiting, controlling for all other influences on visiting behaviour.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the international and national background on the impact of user fees on health-care utilisation and the structure of health-care entitlements in the Irish health-care system. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the data and methods for analysing the implications of differential coverage of free GP care in the Irish system. Results from the analysis are presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6.
CONTEXT

Primary care and user incentives
A key component of an effective primary care system is the design of appropriate financial incentives to ensure that primary care services, and GP services in particular, are the most usual first point of contact with the health service. To ensure that primary care is integrated with the rest of the health-care system, it is also important that financial incentives are aligned across health-care services, and across patients and providers so that health problems are diagnosed at the earliest opportunity and that the most appropriate care takes place in the most appropriate location (Brick et al., 2010) .
This paper focuses on the financial incentives facing users in accessing primary care services.
Payment for health care directly at the point of use has been found to deter utilisation and findings are consistent across a wide range of settings, in both developed and developing countries, and in both natural experiment and controlled trial conditions (Deininger et al., 2004;  M A N U S C R I P T
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4 Gotsadze et al., 2005; 2008; Newhouse et al., 1993; Robinson, 2002; Tamblyn et al., 2001; Trivedi et al., 2008) . For example, in the US, out-of-pocket expenses prevented access to relevant medications in more than one third of a sample of patients with diabetes/at risk of diabetes (Fox et al., 2008) . Specifically, user fees have been observed to deter both appropriate and inappropriate health-care utilisation and are therefore not an effective instrument for rationing only inappropriate demand (Robinson, 2002) . The inability of patients to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate demand means that they are likely to be deterred from some very important interventions (e.g., diagnosis of condition) as well as from some chronic disease management services.
In practice, Robinson (2002) noted that user fees in Europe have comprised a relatively small proportion of total health expenditure. In light of the uncertainty of health-care demand, a greater emphasis has been placed on pre-payment systems (e.g. tax, social health insurance schemes) in order to protect individuals from paying the full financial costs of health care at the time of use. In Ireland, while income from user fees also accounts for a relatively small proportion of total health expenditure, within primary care, user fees are an important source of financing for a large proportion of the population (Brick et al., 2010) . There are two main categories of eligibility for public health care services in Ireland (Table 1) :
-entitlement to free public hospital, primary care and other community care and personal social services (Category I);
-entitlement to public hospital care with charges for per night and outpatient services (Category II).
In Category I, individuals are granted a medical card (referred to here as a 'full medical card' for clarity). The full medical card grants the recipient and dependants free access to public inpatient and outpatient hospital services, GP and pharmacy services, dental, ophthalmic and aural services, medical appliances, maternity and infant care services and a maternity cash grant on the birth of a child. Eligibility for a full medical card is granted on the basis of a means test. Income is the primary criterion and net income is assessed against a set of thresholds, disaggregated by age, household type, and number of children. Allowances are also made for a range of expenses including rent/mortgage, childcare and travel to work expenses (HSE, 2009 years and over were automatically entitled to a full medical card (not including dependants), regardless of income (Government of Ireland, 2001) . Individuals aged 70 and over are now subject to a means test and income is assessed against a gross income threshold specified for this M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D 
a small proportion of those in Category I, purchase supplementary private health insurance (PHI). Supplementary PHI has typically provided cover for acute hospital care but a number of PHI policies now offer at least partial cover for GP, emergency department (ED) and consultant specialist user fees (Brick et al., 2010) . In 2009, an estimated 30 per cent of the population held a full medical card or GP Visit card only and 5 per cent held both a medical card (full or GP Visit) and PHI; 46 per cent of the population held PHI only; and 19 per cent of the population were not covered by a full medical card/GP Visit card or PHI (Brick et al., 2010) .
As illustrated by Table 1 , the different eligibility groups face different prices for health care at different levels. Full medical card holders have free access to public health care in both the primary and acute care sectors, while GP Visit card holders have free access to GP care only and are required to pay out-of-pocket for prescriptions (up to a monthly threshold) and may be liable for charges for other primary and public acute care. Non-medical card holders are required to pay out-of-pocket for all primary care, including GP care, and may be liable for charges for public acute care. PHI status introduces a further layer whereby depending on the type of cover purchased, at least partial reimbursement of the price of acute care, and in some cases, primary care also, may be available.
[insert Table 1 here]
Changes to user incentives in Ireland
To date, the new type of medical card in 2005 which adjusted the price of GP care for a specific group in the population has not been analysed. The GP Visit card was introduced in part from a M A N U S C R I P T
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8 concern at the time over the situation of individuals just above the income threshold for a full medical card. Consistent with international evidence, previous research highlighted the deterrent effect in Ireland of the GP user charge facing non-medical card holders O'Reilly et al., 2007b) , with those just above the income threshold for a full medical card visiting their GP significantly less, even after controlling for need (Nolan, 2008) .This study observes GP utilisation behaviour in the period directly following the introduction of the new GP Visit card.
This provides the first opportunity to examine variations in GP visiting patterns across the different coverage groups, including the new GP Visit card group.
From a policy perspective, providing access to free GP care via a full medical card or a GP Visit card would be expected to have a positive impact on GP utilisation relative to those having to pay (in full or in part) for GP care. However, there are reasons to expect differences in GP visiting behaviour between the full medical card and GP Visit card groups. As noted earlier, alignment of financial incentives within and across different levels of health care is important.
Within primary care, GP services may need to be accessed in conjunction with other primary care services (e.g., prescription medicines). Holders of the full medical card have free access to all primary care services while holders of the GP Visit card are still required to pay out-of-pocket for non-GP primary care (e.g., prescription medicines up to €120 per month). Where both GP and other primary care are needed, the impact on GP utilisation via the GP Visit card may be lower than via the full medical card.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, a number of confounding factors need to be considered when interpreting the results. First, GP utilisation by GP Visit card holders may be artificially high in the period immediately after the policy change if there was pent-up demand M A N U S C R I P T
9 from before the policy change (previously ineligible medical card holders are now able to visit their GP for free). Second, there may be a selection effect, with those most needing to attend a GP applying for, and taking up, the GP Visit card. Third, as with any cross sectional analysis of utilisation behaviour, there is a problem in matching the period of medical card coverage to the period of GP utilisation, discussed in more detail below. Given these factors, the methodological approach aims to examine patterns of GP utilisation across the different groups with and without cover for free GP care in the absence of more detailed longitudinal data.
DATA
We use micro-data from the 2007 Survey of Lifestyle, Attitudes and Nutrition (SLÁN), which was carried out between November 2006 and August 2007. SLÁN contains detailed information on eligibility and health services utilisation, health and lifestyle behaviours and demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Over 10,000 individuals aged 18 years and older were surveyed in face-to-face interviews. The sample was selected from the GeoDirectory, which is a listing of all addresses in Ireland. One respondent per household was selected randomly using the 'next birthday' rule. To ensure the random nature of the sampling, no substitution of respondents within households was allowed. See Morgan et al. (2008) for further details on survey design and methods.
We do not analyse those aged 70 years and over, as all over 70s were automatically entitled to a full medical card during the survey period. Just over 9,000 observations are available on individuals aged 18-69 years. Excluding observations with missing values on variables of interest, the sample for estimation consists of 6,444 individuals. The majority of the missing observations occur for the income variable. We test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the income variable; details are provided in Section 4. Tests for significant differences between the M A N U S C R I P T
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10 full sample and the estimation sample illustrate that while there are no significant differences in most characteristics between the samples, certain groups are over-represented within the estimation sample, namely, those with PHI, former smokers and those with higher levels of education. There are no significant differences in the number of GP visits between the full and estimation samples (results available on request from the authors).
The dependent variable is based on an individual's response to the question 'When was the last time you consulted a GP or family doctor for your own health or health-related needs?' with five possible responses ranging from 'in the last four weeks', 'between 1 and 12 months ago', '1-2 years ago', 'more than two years ago' and 'never'. In common with other applications in the literature, we construct a binary dependent variable, identifying individuals who have visited their GP at least once in the previous year. Table 2 illustrates that approximately 75 per cent of the estimation sample had visited their GP in the previous year, consistent with findings from the earlier Living in Ireland surveys (Nolan, 2007) . Just under a quarter had visited their GP within the last month, while another quarter had last visited their GP over one year ago.
[insert Table 2 here]
Our main independent variable of interest, free GP care coverage, is a four-category variable identifying full medical card holders (the reference category), GP Visit card holders, those with PHI only and those with no cover. Full medical card and GP Visit card holders may take out PHI if they wish, but as the numbers doing so are small (a large proportion of those holding both a medical card and PHI are aged 70 and older), they are aggregated with the full medical card and GP Visit card categories. While largely taken out to confer faster access to hospital services, PHI plans are increasingly providing cover for primary care expenses, usually in the form of a part refund of the cost of a GP consultation. Preliminary data from the Growing up in (Brick et al., 2010) . The discrepancies arise because we examine those aged 18-69 years only.
Other independent variables include those reflecting 'need' for health care such as age, gender and various indicators of health status, and other ('non-need') variables that might be expected to influence GP visiting such as household equivalised income, education level, employment status and marital status. One of the advantages of SLÁN is that it contains detailed information on many aspects of individual health status and behaviour. We include common indicators of health status such as self-assessed health status, the presence of a chronic health problem or disability, the presence of a limiting condition and an index of mental health, as well as highly aggregated. Section 6 discusses some of the data limitations in greater detail. Table 3 presents variable definitions and sample means for the additional independent variables used in this analysis.
[insert Table 3 (Nolan, 2007) .
METHODOLOGY
The nature of the data on GP visiting determines the type of methodology employed. We use a binary logit model, which estimates the probability of having at least one GP visit in the previous year. We estimate both restricted (i.e., including the coverage variables only) and unrestricted Estimation results are presented in the form of average marginal effects, calculated for each observation and averaged over the sample. All models are estimated using Stata, version 11.0.
As mentioned in Section 3, a number of observations were dropped from the analysis due to missing information for income. We run two additional models to test the robustness of our results. First, we exclude income from the model altogether, and second, we include the missing income observations by including a 'missing' income category. In both cases, the results for the coverage variables are unchanged in sign, significance and relative magnitude from the model with the missing income observations excluded (results available on request from the authors).
As the dependent variable is based on an individual's response to the question 'When was the last time you consulted a GP or family doctor for your own health or health-related needs?' with five possible
responses ranging from 'in the last four weeks', 'between 1 and 12 months ago', '1-2 years ago', 'more than two years ago' and 'never', it is possible to utilise the extra information in the underlying question to estimate an ordered logit model. We estimated an ordered logit model and the results for the coverage categories are similar in sign and significance to those from the binary logit model (results available on request from the authors). However, the response categories are not necessarily an indicator of frequency and the ordered logit model is not able to distinguish between a frequent visitor who simply did not attend in the last four weeks and an infrequent visitor who visited just once in the last year. Thus, results are presented for the binary logit model only.
RESULTS
As noted, the key hypothesis of this paper is that due to the existence of differing prices for GP services across the population, we expect to see a gradient in GP visiting, controlling for all other M A N U S C R I P T
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14 influences on visiting behaviour. First, in comparison with full medical card holders, we expect those with PHI and no cover will have a significantly lower probability of having at least one GP visit per annum. In addition, as those with PHI face either the full or subsidised cost of a GP visit, we expect rates of GP visiting to be low, but not as low as those with no cover. Second, we have no clear expectation for a differential effect between full medical card holders and GP Visit card holders. Both face a zero price for GP visits, but as noted above, the fact that GP Visit card holders are not eligible for other primary care services free of charge (e.g., prescription medicines) may mean that GP Visit card holders are more aware of the potential for associated prescription charges when contemplating a GP visit, and adjust their GP visiting behaviour accordingly (i.e., only visiting with severe health complaints). On the other hand, the possibility that the GP Visit card holders in this sample are selected and/or subject to possible pent-up demand may imply little difference in GP visiting between GP Visit card holders and full medical card holders.
Summary statistics for our dependent variable by coverage are presented in Table 2 . The patterns are in the directions expected and present tentative evidence in favour of a difference in GP visiting behaviour for full medical card and GP Visit card holders. For example, those with no cover have the lowest proportion with at least one GP visit in the last year, followed by those with PHI only and then those with GP Visit cards, with those with full medical cards having the highest proportion. Of course, the four coverage groups differ not only with respect to the price of a GP visit, but also with respect to other characteristics, such as age, health status and socioeconomic circumstances. A multivariate analysis is therefore necessary. Table 4 However, the effect of a GP Visit card is insignificant.
The remaining independent variables have results that are largely consistent with expectations and with previous analyses of GP visiting behaviour in Ireland. The probability of having at least one GP visit in the previous year at first decreases as individuals age, but then increases significantly over the age of 55 years. Females are significantly more likely than males to have at least one GP visit in the previous year. All health status indicators are significant. Having a higher score on the mental health index is also significantly associated with having at least one GP visit in the previous year. Alcohol consumption is insignificant, while those that are former smokers and are overweight are significantly more likely to visit their GP. Being married and having a higher level of education is associated with a significantly higher probability of having at least one GP visit in the previous year. Household equivalised income is insignificant however; this suggests that there is no gradient in GP visiting by income once coverage has been accounted for. A quadratic income term was also tested, but was dropped due to insignificance.
[insert Table 4 here]
DISCUSSION
The results from our analysis suggest that there is a gradient in GP visiting in Ireland, with GP Visit card holders, those with PHI and those with no cover all having a lower probability of visiting their GP at least once per annum than full medical card holders. Consistent with the difference in relative prices, those with no cover have the lowest probability of GP visiting. The effect for GP Visit card holders is insignificant however.
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There are a number of possible interpretations of the effect for GP Visit card holders relative to holders of the full medical card. First, as discussed, both full medical card and GP Visit card holders face a zero monetary price for GP visits, which would imply that, conditional on all other influences on GP visiting behaviour, there should be no significant difference in GP visiting behaviour between the two groups. However, full medical card and GP Visit card holders do face differing prices for other public health services, including prescription medicines (zero and full cost up to a monthly deductible of €120 respectively). If individuals base their decision on whether or not to visit a GP on the price of the consultation and the possibility of associated prescription costs for example, then we would expect GP Visit card holders to have a significantly lower probability of GP visiting than full medical card holders. While GP Visit card holders do have a lower probability of visiting their GP, their probability of GP visiting is not significantly different to full medical card holders once other influences on GP visiting have been included in the model.
Another explanation for the absence of a significant difference in GP visiting between full medical card holders and GP Visit card holders may be related to the release of previous pent-up demand for GP care amongst the GP Visit card holders. Similar patterns of pent-up demand have been found in the US with the use of longitudinal data to show an increase in utilisation of health care services by previously uninsured individuals on becoming eligible for Medicare insurance at the age of 65 (McWilliams et al., 2003) . A third and related explanation is the possible selection effect whereby those with the greatest need for GP care were more likely to apply for, and take up, the GP Visit card as soon as it was introduced. From a national perspective, there is evidence that the take-up of the GP Visit card has been lower than ii The data are unable to distinguish between these three effects and a longitudinal before/after study would be required to fully unpick the role of pent-up demand.
With regard to the selection effect, there is some scope for further analysis using the existing data. Ideally, it should be possible to identify in SLÁN individuals who are non-GP Visit card holders, but who are eligible on the basis of the assessment criteria. This would establish a subgroup of individuals who have not taken up the GP Visit card ('non-take-up' group) which could then be compared with the sub-group who have taken up the GP Visit card. In practice, the process of simulating medical card/GP Visit card eligibility on the basis of survey data and the medical card assessment guidelines is complicated by the number of discretionary elements in the assessment guidelines, and by limitations in the available data. This is not unique to SLÁN data and the difficulties have been experienced in other analyses (Callan et al., 2008) . For this paper, we made a conservative estimate of the net income threshold (making allowances for additional expenses of rent/mortgage payments, etc.) below which eligibility for a GP Visit card was assumed. Comparing GP utilisation for the 'non-take-up' group with the GP Visit card group shows lower utilisation in the former group, consistent with a selection effect (but also with pent-up demand). However, the effects (using various income thresholds) are only marginally significant. The lack of significant difference between the two groups is likely due to lack of statistical power, as the groups concerned are small. Results available on request from the authors.
It is important to consider the international context and the extent to which the patterns of The most similar case to the Republic of Ireland is that of New Zealand (although the current primary care reforms in New Zealand are moving away from individual targeting of benefits towards universal targeting via Primary Health Organisations; see (Cumming et al., 2011) for a review). Prior to the current reforms in New Zealand, the community services card (CSC) operated in a similar manner to the Irish medical card, except that it covered a larger proportion of the population (approximately 50 per cent) and cardholders received a subsidy from the government for each GP visit (equivalent to approximately one third of the full cost), rather than free GP visits in the Irish case. Regression analysis has found that the CSC cardholders were significantly more likely to visit their GP, controlling for need and other socio-economic characteristics (Scott et al., 2003) . Similar to the Irish concerns over take-up of the GP Visit card, the New Zealand CSC was also subject to low take-up, and this in part has motivated the movement towards universal targeting of subsidies for GP visits via higher capitation payments to Primary Health Organisations (Cumming et al., 2011) . In many countries however, while GP visits may be free, prescription pharmaceuticals are subject to co-payments (similar to the situation for GP Visit card holders). There are concerns that such a system creates barriers to accessing GP services as individuals consider the cost of the prescription in deciding whether to visit their GP; see Fast et al. (1998) , Allin et al. (2009) and Stabile (2001) for Canadian evidence. GP during this period suggests that increased GP care lessened the impact of illness and reduced disability (Layte et al., 2009) . To analyse in more depth the impact of access to free primary care on health status, longitudinal data are essential.
Irish policy with respect to GP services has targeted benefits on the less well-off, rather than extending benefits to the entire population. However, a recent report proposed a new system of entitlements and user fees which would extend varying levels of subsidisation for GP services (ranging from 20 per cent to 100 per cent) to the entire population, thus encouraging registration with GPs, prevention and maintenance of good health, and the abolition of many of the current anomalies in the Irish system (Ruane, 2010) . It also avoids the large jumps in entitlement that accompany movements from full medical card to GP Visit card to non-medical card status under the current system that may also have wider effects (e.g., on labour market participation). The a Exemptions apply (e.g., children up to 6 weeks of age) M A N U S C R I P T (Barry et al., 2009) . b Based on the estimation sample of those aged 18-69 years.
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